Complex-Information Theory - Detailed

Even if you are already familiar with information theory and complexity science, I still recommend reading "Information" and "Complexity" pages to understand my articulation of these important foundations for this theory .

The preceding discussions of information and complexity have laid the groundwork for a line of argument that the “good” can be circumscribed and even grounded at the level of physical reality – at least often times. (This last caveat is important and will be discussed in detail later.) If we agree that information and complexity itself is ultimately about the relationships or “relata” amongst its components, then an ethical theory that places its foundation on relationships is not new. It is worthwhile for us to at least mention a few of the different relational ethics that have been previously formulated.

The importance of human relationships in ethics is a central tenet of the “ethics of care,” and dates to the early 1980’s with Carol Gilligan’s (b. 1936) and Nel Noddings (b. 1929) separate articulations (Gilligan, C (1982), “In a Different Voice,” Harvard University Press; Noddings N (1984) “Caring – A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education,” University of California, Press ). In brief, this ethics emphasizes the moral importance of fostering interpersonal relationships and the virtue of caring. (Prior ethical theories that were formulated primarily by men typically ignored, or at least diminished the importance of this aspect of morality.) Human relationships often have a syntactical aspect to them because the relationship between a parent and child or an aunt and nephew can be traced to their shared genomes. The semantic informational nature of human relationships, however, often overshadows the pure syntactical as exemplified by bonds between non-genetically related community members, spouses, friends, and non-biological parent to son and daughter where the meaning of their shared past, values, burdens, and other aspects of life are paramount – and arguably the semantics of shared relationships are more important than even the shared syntactics (shared genetics) of related kin.

American Indian’s and Aldo Leopold’s (1887-1948) “land ethic,” and Arne Naess’ (1912-2009) “deep ecology” extends ethical concerns beyond human relationships to that which we have with the environmenthttp://davidkeller.us/publications/Keller-Deep_Ecology%20EEEP.pdf . All these ethical theories recognize that the environment or biosphere has deep meaning and purpose for us not just because of its appreciated beauty, and provision of solace, but also because we simply cannot survive without it. These ethics also point out, if only using a different lexicon, that we are syntactically an inextricable part of the natural world – not somehow beyond or above it.

At the extreme end of relational ethics lies Luciano Floridi’s (b. 1964) “macroscopic information ethics” which gives ethical value to the results of relationships that occur at even the atomic and molecular level so that every thing has value, even if that value might be “minimal and overrideable.” (Floridi, L., Information Ethics, Its Nature and Scope, SIGCAS Computes and Society, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2006). The Oxford “philosopher of information” labels his ethical theory as being “ontocentric,” which essentially means “existence centered.” Semantic informational content in information ethics would presumably only be of secondary importance because sacred mountain like Mount Sinai would not necessarily be accorded more ethical consideration than an unnamed mountain peak in an unnamed mountain range. The practicality of such an all-encompassing ethic makes its application challenging to say the least. Information ethics also argues that entropy is undesirable.

Other authors have argued for an association between information and “the good,” increased entropy and “the bad,” or both as noted earlier. Of the former proposed information-centric theories, “universal ethics” which was proposed by philosopher and former IBHA member, Clement Vidal, and the Belgian physicist, Jean-Paul Delahaye, (V&D) in 2018 is most consistent with the theory for which I will be arguing. (Delahaye J-P, Vidal C (2018) “Universal Ethics: Organized Complexity as an Intrinsic Value,” file:///C:/Users/KEN/Downloads/Delahaye%20Vidal%20-%20Universal%20ethics%20v2%20(3).pdf , accessed 1/18/21). “Universal ethics” central proposition is: “the essential nature of the good is that which preserves, augments, or “recursively” promotes (i.e., indefinitely helps to perpetuate) complexities.” Their proposition preceded mine in publication and possibly conception, even if derived independently. However, while we concur on the important central proposition for an ethical theory, we quickly diverge on important, relevant points as well. Before examining that divergence, let us look at their concordance.

The Good is That Which Preserves and Promotes Complexities

For the sake of brevity, I will reduce universal ethics central proposition to: “the good is that which preserves and promotes complexities,” with the understanding that “promotes” means to do so singularly as well as recursively. Therefore, as V&D argue, actions that enhance the “health, wealth, friendship, honesty, safety, freedom, and equality” of a complexity are “broad invariant positive values,” and actions such as “murder, theft, rape, lying, and destruction” are “generally negative values.” As already noted, many commenters will also categorize the negative values as (increased) entropies. This proposition is succinct, and it does capture the “spirit” of what other traditional ethical theories propose as being good. Even if universal ethics is founded on a different basis than Aristotle’s Nicomachean (virtue-based) ethics, Kant’s deontological ethics (reason-based), Bentham and Stuart’s utilitarian ethics (greatest good for greatest number), and natural law ethics (that which is concordant with nature is good)- This list is certainly not comprehensive but is representative of prior anthropocentric theories.

A non-anthropocentric ethical framework like universal ethics is especially relevant in this age where the effects of human numbers and activities are causing a great variety of harms on non-human complexities such as other living species, ecosystems, and even the entire biosphere as in the case of global warming. Recognizing that many if not the great majority of complexities have value beyond short-term anthropocentric concerns and before they become so harmed that they are unrecoverable, or even “simply” suffer should be a human responsibility that we shoulder with a great sense of duty. Even if a few other species such as chimpanzees have nascent ethical reasoning abilities (De Waal F (2996), “Primates and Philosophers,” Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press), it seems that we are the only species that can most anticipate and adjust our plans to try to change the long-term future outcomes of our actions. As V&D also point out, “land ethics” and a few other relational theories mentioned earlier broaden their scope of concerns to include the biosphere, but do not have a framework to address potential moral dilemmas that would be posed by profound new possible complexities like artificial, advanced intelligence or extra-terrestrial life.

Universal ethics also proposes that there can be different “levels” of preserving and promoting complexities. For example, (my own) saving an endangered species like the white rhinoceros by keeping them in a zoo would be an act of simple preservation of a non-reproducible complexity; once the species is extinct, it cannot be recreated. Raising money and other resources to set aside a nature preserve for them to live would be a yet higher level of beneficence because you would not only preserve the complexity, but also promote its overall well-being by allowing them to live in a setting that would be natural and presumably more enjoyable for the rhinoceros. Creating legal and bureaucratic policies, funding, protection, introducing other rhinoceroses for reproduction, etc., would be a higher level again of promotion because you would recursively promote it well-being via its likely progeny into the foreseeable future - while also promoting the complex ecosystem of which it is an integral part.

V&D importantly offer five different general goals for augmenting overall complexity: 1. “Global” augmentation where the complexity of C1 + C 2 + . . . Cx is increased overall. 2. “Additive” augmentation where the complexity of each individual system is enhanced, so that C1 < C1’, C2<C2”, . . . Cx < Cx’, 3. “Egalitarian” augmentation where the complexity of the least is increased most, 4. “Elitist” augmentation where the complexity of the greatest is promoted the most, and 5. “Nashian,” named after the mathematician John Nash (1928-2015), augmentation where the product of complexities is maximized (C1 x C2 x . . . Cx ) which they state would be a compromise between options 3 and 4 (Vidal (2018)).

Considering which of these different general goals for increasing complexity overall could be important for philosophers or policy makers that, for example, seek to improve social or distributive justice. Improving the lot of those who are already quite wealthy would be an elitist approach. John Rawls theory of justice would be most consistent with the additive approach, where the most well-off are justified to make gains, so long as others, including those with the least receive gains as well. Which of these 5 goals would create the greatest good overall, an admittedly utilitarian calculus, would depend on the circumstances at hand and the answer can be varied and challenging, especially when complexities of different types are at stake, e.g. leaving a forest intact and healthy versus providing lumber for human jobs and housing materials.

How Complex-Information Differs from Universal Ethics

This article is not intended to be a polemic against V&D’s universal ethics. Indeed, I am in debt to them for some of their insights that had not occurred to me. We diverge, however, on at least three fundamental points: 1. Complexities should not necessarily be preserved and promoted without exception, 2. How to determine if a system qualifies as being complex, and 3. Complexity is not the only source of the “good.”

Should There be Caveats to Preserving and Promoting Complexity?

It is a fair question to ask if even “advanced” complexities, like rhinoceroses, rain forests, and human societies are always morally good to preserve and promote. Complexity science and empirical historical evidence indicates that we should be always cautious when simple solutions, pronouncements, and predictions are proffered for our intricately and manifold connected world. Science fiction also paints hypothetical scenarios, as exemplified in the movies like “The Matrix,” “The Terminator,” and “Avengers – The Age of Ultron,” where advanced artificial intelligences conclude that the planet will be better off without humanity. Perhaps their non-anthropocentric utilitarian calculus is correct! The question, even if disturbing in its answer, is worth examining and Big History perhaps provides the needed “food for thought:”

Hunter-gatherer societies of ancient to modern humans have persisted on Earth for hundreds of thousands of years. Once bands of modern humans, in particular, left Africa it appears that even their primitive technologies and hunting strategies caused or at least contributed to the extinction of megafauna in Australia, the Americas and New Zealand relatively soon after arrival. Of course, other negative increases in “entropies” occurred to the respective environments due to the clearing of landscapes by the intentional setting of fires to landscapes, the introduction of rats, dogs and other foreign species, and likely other negative changes as well. Regardless, even in lands outside of Africa, where other species had co-evolved with humans, the ecosystems on which we depend were sustainable for humans and millions of other species for tens of thousands of years.

The changes wrought by human agriculture, a more complex lifestyle, introduced more new stresses on the environment, and at times the new entropies and demands on local resources led to changes that were not sustainable even for the supremely adaptable human. The collapse of the societies and the lost of forests on Rapa Nui (Easter Island), the regression of Mayan civilization, and various Malthusian crises endured by societies in the old world as well were instances where the increased complexities of agriculture could not be sustained – at least locally. At least, however, agricultural societies have persisted for 1,000’s of years and conceivably could continue to persist if care was taken to not outstrip critical resources or impose too many ecological stresses.

The even more complex modern industrial-technological-capitalistic societies began in earnest about 250 years ago and became nearly global in less than the past century. Hence, its longevity remains on open question. The many new increases in entropy imposed on the Earth’s biosphere by this lifestyle are far too many to recount (e.g., pollution, species extinction, soil erosion, resource depletion . . .), and global warming is perhaps the single greatest imposition that this lifestyle is imposing on the biosphere. (Perhaps ironically, “heat” is the ultimate entropy!)

Furthermore, the energy needs of agriculture is estimated to have required 5 times the energy needs of hunter-gatherer societies while modern society has increased it by 115 times per capita (Cook, E. (1971). The Flow of Energy in an Industrial Society. Scientific American, 225(3), 134-147. Retrieved January 17, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24923122 ). Importantly, our numbers have increased drastically from earlier times as well, so the amount of energy needed to sustain human society if there were about 6 million humans living around the planet at the beginning of the agrarian revolution (Christian, D (2011) p144), and there are nearly 8 billion people alive today (United States Census Bureau, accessed 1/17/2021, from Population Clock: World (census.gov) is increased by a factor of over 1,000 by itself. Granted, not every society in the world consumes the energy of modern Western societies, so that the 1,000 x 115 increase from the total energy needs of hunter-gatherers would likely be an overestimate. Nevertheless, a modern society which relies predominately on nonrenewable energy sources such as fossil fuels (U.S. Energy Information Administration web site, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32912, accessed 1/18/21), as we currently do, cannot continue for thousands of years based on current energy demands alone. Add the depletion of various limited material resources and the many increases in entropy that we have not been able to compensate for so far, and it is apparent that the current modern lifestyle will not likely persist for hundreds, never mind thousands of years based on thermodynamic considerations alone. It remains to be seen if human society can change so that like long persisting natural ecosystems, critical resources are recycled, energy demands are carefully managed or new sustainable sources are found, and entropies are harmlessly radiated into space. Therefore, it appears that the proposition, “it is the good to preserve, promote, and recursively promote” of complexities,” is in jeopardy, and caveats are at least warranted.

Given the foregoing analysis, the first caveat for the preservation and promotion of a complexity is that that complexity should be neutral or net positive over spacetime regarding its energy needs, entropy “management,” and material resource utilization. Ecosystems and hunter-gatherer societies can persist indefinitely because the sun (primarily) was able to provide sufficient energy and offset the increases in entropies caused by these systems. Material resources were replenished by the recycling and renewal of nutrients via various chemical pathways, plant photosynthesis and decomposition, and plate tectonics to name a few. Perhaps modern humans can adjust its various behaviors and technologies so that it lives in thermodynamic harmony with the only biosphere on which it depends, and future a.i.’s can come to a different conclusion, but that remains to be seen.

Unfortunately, the phrase “net positive” implies that we can quantitatively determine which complexities are “net positive” when we can only do so in the roughest sense. Often, however, the determination is more qualitative, and a more appropriate term that reflects that reality might be “eudaimonic,” or that which promotes flourishing overall - to borrow a Greek word from Aristotelian ethics. For example, at present it seems the internet is eudaimonic because its presence greatly facilitates the exchange of information, improves the efficiency of commerce, and so forth. However, it also has a dark or increased entropic side as exemplified by misinformation and disinformation that are quickly, pervasively, and inexpensively distributed, users are subjected to various online scams, computer viruses are a constant threat, and the vulnerability to vital societal infrastructures such as the electrical grid, transportation systems by another means are possible. If for some reason, the internet should become self-aware and imposes a “Terminator-like” solution, or a saboteur should gain control of a nuclear arsenal, then the apparent “net positive” of the internet could become a net-negative complexity. In short, time will tell if a new complexity like the internet is positive, neutral, or negative overall.

Just as a system being complex does not automatically qualify it as a definite good, an increase in entropy is not necessarily a bad contrary to the pronouncements of thinkers from Norbert Wiener to Luciano Floridi. As figure 4 abstractly depicts, an increase in entropy must accompany any process, including the “preservation and promotion” of complexities. In fact, the preservation of greater complexities or the promotion of a simpler to a greater complexity both incur a greater increase in entropy than the preservation of simpler entities. The reason for entropy’s “bad reputation” is because the vast majority of states that result from its increase result in a less optimal states for the system in question, perhaps even its destruction.

Figure 4. Each circle with triangular arrows (representing interactions between component), is an abstract representation of a complex system. The 2 circles to the left represent the preservation of complex system “A” which requires both energy and materials so that “work” energy and various processes can maintain that system. Entropy is a “waste” product of the process. For example, the Earth receives high energy photons from the sun as energy to drive various process such as photosynthesis, weather phenomena, ocean currents, etc. Earth then re-radiates low energy infra-red photons back into space as entropy. A complex system “A’” that advances to a more complex system “B” requires even more energy, materials, and “emanates” greater entropy as well.

What Makes a System “Complex?”

Admittedly, before even discussing a term as loaded as “complex,” we should have an agreed upon definition or some other basis for deciding what qualifies as being complex. Everyone would agree for example, that human society and the biosphere are complex systems, but when did the internet become complex, or if it even qualifies as being complex at this time? Indeed, it is in answering this very kind of question where universal ethics and “complex-information” (C-I) ethics markedly diverges. Universal ethics solely uses a metric developed by the physicist Charles Bennett (b. 1943) called “logical depth” to determine if something qualifies as being complex. Logical depth uses the number of calculations a “Turing” machine (i.e., an abstract computer) would theoretically need to construct a system to determine its complexity. If a great number of calculations would be required, then it is also highly complex and vice versa. Presumably, it would take many more calculations to give the information to construct a blue whale than a bacterium, and so the former is much more complex. Importantly, the hypothetical Turing machine calculations would include the entire history of events leading up to that system’s manifestation. In the case of the blue whale, it took several billion more years of calculation after bacteria became manifest. Therefore, something that can only be made artificially also has great logical depth because the requisite human, or even other advanced life forms, have great logical depth in themselves which would be then added to the calculations need to make the artifact. Consequently, the following items, which typically are not considered complexities by complexity science authorities, would be included in universal ethics as having intrinsic value worth preserving and promoting due to their “logical depth:” works of art, scientific theories, books, libraries, monuments, and microprocessors.

However, there are fundamental challenges to using logical depth or even other metrics as the arbiter of something being complex versus non-complex. First, experts in the field of complexity science agree that there no single reliable metric of a complex system due to various limitations that every metric has encountered so far. Two immediate problems with the logical depth are that, 1. There is no good way to determine the calculations needed to construct a complexity, and 2. There is not consensus of what the hypothetical Turing machine would consist. Many other metrics have also been proposed to measure complexity (one authority counted 40!), but all have met notable failures when applied to actual systems (Melanie Mitchell, “Complexity – A Guided Tour,” Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2009, pp95-111). Many big historians will also be familiar with Eric Chaisson’s admirable work on using “energy flow densities” to quantitatively determine a complexity’s degree or depth. However, obvious contradictions to this metric exist, such as modern computers that are many times more complex than those of the 1960’s but can run on a button battery and fit in a cell phone versus a large generator to power a machine that takes up the space of a full-sized room. At the very least, the efficiency of free energy flow density must also be considered because modern computers are much more complex than vacuum tube computers.

The artifact or process in question should also be able to stand on its own when determining if it is a complexity rather than incorporating an ill-defined history of its origin. If we state that the entire constructive or calculative history of the entity in question is the determinate of it being a complexity, including the humans which designed and manufactured it, then anything artificial would be counted as “complex” including ping pong paddles and pencils, as well as microprocessors. One simple litmus test for determining if something is a complexity would be to imagine asking an extra-terrestrial alien who is unfamiliar with our species and our artifacts: “does what we call a ‘painting,’ ‘symphony,’ or ‘science textbook’ that you see before you seem to be complex systems, or just patterns of pigments on a sheet of fabric, a series of sound waves with (admittedly) extraordinary mathematical relationships, or unusual marks on sheets of compressed wood pulp, respectively?”

Finally, and most fundamentally, it is a mistake to employ a metric before determining that you are measuring that which you intend measure. For example, you would not want to use an intelligence quotient (I.Q.) test to measure someone’s mood.

As noted in my earlier discussion, there is no widely agreed upon definition for complexity despite several decades of research. (Melanie Mitchell, (2009) “Complexity – A Guided Tour,” New York, Oxford University Press). The term “complexity” is not unique in facing this quandary, because there is no widely accepted definition for terms like “life,” “happiness,” or “human being” either. For these terms as well as “complexity,” however, there is greater, if still not universal, agreement for using criteria to determine if a system is complex or non-complex. One of the most glaring missing criterium for artifacts listed by V&D is “dynamism.” Complex system change over time in response to various signals from both within and without the system. Artifacts like textbooks, most works of visual arts, and even unpowered microprocessors just “sit there,” and with no propensity for self-organization, renewal, or adaptation.

Why Complexities Have Intrinsic Values: No Complexity, No Ethics!

What it means for something to have “intrinsic” ethical value is important to address concisely if not comprehensively. The assertion that artifacts, processes, and systems can have a value that is independent of their instrumental value to humans became more relevant when theories like “land ethics” asserted that ecosystems and non-human species were of moral valuable independent of whether humans were there to appreciate and utilize them or not. This assertion is consistent with the historic trend to remove humans from being “the center of the universe” to one where we are perhaps special, but not an indispensable part of the universe’s grand design. However, as the philosophers Kevin Gibson and Dale Jamieson point out, if there is no “valuer” something cannot attain that value (Jamieson, D (2008), “Ethics and the Environment – An Introduction,” Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press; Gibson K (2011), “In Theory – Making Sense of the Sacred,” Negotiation Journal.) Because humans are the primary agents that assign ethical value to items and processes, it seems that we are back to an anthropocentric “world of ethics.” However, I would argue that complexity is a prerequisite for there to be a moral agent to even be extant. Somehow, the intricate and extensive syntactical relata that occurs within the human brain and perhaps a few other advanced animals like chimpanzees, enables and provokes us to make judgments about what is “right” and what is “wrong.”

Admittedly, it is possible that there are highly intelligent, sentient alien beings that do not concern themselves about ethics, lack a theory of mind, etc. and do actions based on a “cold” calculation of how to advance the interests of their own or their species. Even amongst humans there are psychopaths whose seemingly ethical choices are actually driven by self-interest with little regards to weighing the value of others. Their apparent “good” choices might be driven by a pragmatic fear of being caught or some anticipated reward for themselves via “game theory-type” calculations rather than an ethical judgement to do what is right for its own sake. Still, a high degree of complexity is necessary for a genuine moral agent to exist, even if that degree of complexity might not be sufficient. Therefore, complexities have intrinsic ethical value (that can still be negated as noted earlier) because it is a prerequisite for ethics to even exist.

If complexity is a prerequisite for ethics, then what about other prerequisites like planets, stars, molecules and the universe itself? Floridi’s ontocentric “information ethics” would give intrinsic ethical value to all these components.

With the possible exception of the cosmic microwave background and black holes, everything that is has some standing ethical value. This assertion goes too far, however, because humans and other known complexities at least, cannot do any actions that positively or negatively affect molecules, planets, stars, and the universe. In other words, they are not potential ethical “patients,” whereas complexities as vast as Earth’s biosphere has been proven to be susceptible to our decisive actions. Therefore, complexities are both necessary for ethics to exist, and complexities can be made better or worse by ethical agents.

Non-complex, but Still Has Ethical Value?

While it might be desirable for ethicists to determine that the “good” can be distilled to a single mandate such as, “we ought to preserve, promote, and restore net positive complexities,” this lofty goal is unlikely to, and arguably cannot be achieved given our inherently complex nature that is inextricably embedded in a complex world (see below). Still, we might be able to approach a few fundamentals that lie at the heart of what we ethically value. After all, I agree with D&V and others that we ethically should value most complexities and it is good to preserve, promote them. While complexities depend on deep syntactical content and processes for their ontology as well as their value, however, other artifacts and processes depend on another type of information for their value, including works of art, monuments, new discoveries in science, and other things of import to humans and other relevant complexities.

Semantic Information – Another Significant Source of the Good

Many artifacts and processes that we value are not a good because they are complex systems, but because we imbue them with meaning or purpose. In the lexicon of information theory, they have semantical import to us, and subsequently their value is instrumental to us as agents rather than their value necessarily being based on complexity. V&D labeled a number of artificial items as being complex because humans made them possible which in turn made them complex by extension via “logical depth” as noted earlier. However, the vast majority of those who study complexity would undoubtedly disagree with this assessment. Instead, in the case of the arts and spectated sports, their value is derived from their ability to express, represent, or invoke a desired emotional or psychological state to humans rather than their syntactical informational “depth.” Indeed, some people value minimalist paintings of simple geometric figures over the detailed works of artists like Rembrandt, or the simpler musical composition of Phillip Glass over the multi-layered compositions of Beethoven. The value that we give works of art or sporting events that succeed in positively affecting the emotions of thousands to billions of people, is reflected by the many high-profile awards like the Golden Globe, Oscars, Emmy, Vince Lombardi trophy, World Cup, etc., that we shower on artists and athletes alike.

In contrast, while healthcare professionals, safety personnel, teachers, religious ministers, and others that enhance the cognitive, physical, spiritual, and other forms of well-being might be respected, they do not often enjoy the celebrity status and endless parade of televised awards afforded to artists and athletes who affect the emotional states of many people via mass media. There are exceptions to others attaining celebrity status and high-profile awards, but as with artists and athletes, it is most often due to their service or products being widely experienced via mass media, or mass production (e.g. best-selling non-fiction books, popular TV documentaries). Therefore, the quality as well as the “quantity” of semantic information imparted to others increase the popular value of art, sports, and other products sometimes even beyond how critical they are to our overall well-being. As a stark example, consider that having access to clean water positively affects the physical well-being of more people than any other single action taken by society. Yet, how many people know that John Snow is the physician who discovered the association between epidemics of cholera and water contaminated with sewage compared to the fame of former basketball player, Michael Jordan? (http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/snowcricketarticle.html, accessed 9/28/2020). Of course, this example and the others regarding popular culture only highlights that what we parochially value for semantic reasons and what we should value more highly are not necessarily the same.

Another example of things that are not complex but can have deep semantic content are symbols of institutions, communities, and ideals. They are semantic proxies for institutions, belief systems, communities, and the like, which are often highly valued. An honor or an affront bestowed on them becomes a similar honor or affront to those and that which they represent. Flags, religious icons, and other such symbols are typically quite simple syntactically, like the Christian cross and the Japanese flag. Rituals (e.g., the pledge of allegiance) and proper handling of some symbols (e.g., do not let the flag touch the ground) to demonstrate reverence toward these symbols and what they represent amounts to the virtue of their preservation or promotion. Conversely, ignoring their proper handling or damaging them can be considered deeply immoral by the agents devoted to what they represent. Artifacts that humans elevate to the level of being “sacred” can have especially deep semantic meaning to people and inspire pilgrimages, great charities, and, conversely, great tragedies like crusades and pogroms.

The list of types of things that have great semantical import to us is not meant to be comprehensive. However, the artifacts and processes mentioned fall far short of being complex, and might not even be directly necessary for the well-being of a complexity, but can still warrant being things that ought to be preserved and promoted. Because symbols are not universal, but given meaning by a community of agents, someone who is ignorant of their semantic content should be forgiven if they naively shred Van Gogh’s original “Starry Night,” burn an alleged fragment of the Jesus’ Cross, or interrupt a solemn eulogy. There is nothing intrinsic to their syntactical informational structure or processes to indicate that they might have universal value. Instead, their value is instrumental and agent dependent.

Novel Information – Another Potential Source of the Good

Some goods are highly valued by humans for an important subset of semantic information that is worthy of consideration: they are rare and relevant, or they provide us with new knowledge, i.e., give us a new understanding about the relata of the world. I have already discussed that Shannon’s “surprise” of a message (which I prefer to call “novelty”) is a measure of how unexpected that message was to its recipient, and the formula for measuring that surprise is s(x) = log 1/p(x), where “s(x)” is the surprise measured in bits, and “p(x)” is the probability of that message occurring. Therefore, messages, events, or other things that occur rarely are reflected by its “surprise” being consequently large. The informational surprise of finding life in the universe will be enormous, not just psychologically for us, but even from a purely mathematical perspective because the vast, vast majority of the universe is empty space, and just a tiny percentage of mass consists of potentially life-sustaining planets – the remainder of the mass being in inhospitable stars, nebulas, gas giants, and black holes.

Claude Shannon mainly expressed the “surprise” of a message as being a way of how much it reduces your uncertainty regarding some more pragmatic question. For example, the two lanterns in the North church bell tower reduced Paul Revere’s uncertainty regarding which way British troops would travel by 50% or 1 bit. Similarly, science works to better understand the countless laws, states, processes, etc. of the universe, and a new discovery reduces our uncertainty about that aspect of the universe. Of course, science is not the only source of novel information. It can range from finding where your misplaced car keys are located, to a historian finding the mention of a forgotten civilization in an old manuscript. Admittedly, novel information is not always easy or even possible to measure. Finding your extra set of car keys amongst 20 possible locations is hypothetically measurable. However, if you have not seen them for years and have moved several places since you last saw them, a precise value becomes nigh impossible to calculate. The novelty or surprise of discovering a forgotten civilization is also incalculable but would ostensibly be some large number of bits.

“Surprise” or novelty can also be a measure of rarity and non-complexities that are rare can become an increased good for simply that reason. The 40 known Gutenberg bibles (encyclopedia Britannica), approximately 244 Stradivarius violins (https://newviolinist.com/how-many-stradivarius-violins-are-there/ ), rare Ming vases, and the single sculpture of “David” by Michelangelo are important semantically to us because of their historicity and aesthetics , but it is especially their non-reproducible rarity that adds to their value such that their intentional damage or loss would be a wrong significant enough to make national or even international news due to the collective angst their loss would cause their devotees. Contrarily, modern widely distributed Bibles that might be more accurate interpretations of the original writings, and hence, more closely reflect “the word of God” to the faithful, would still be typically considered to be of less value, and of a lesser loss if even far more than 44 editions were damaged or stolen.

Artifacts and processes with novel informational content can also be valued for advancing other aspects of human well-being besides emotional. Scientific, historical, philosophical, and other types of discoveries, as well as new technological material artifacts and processes like the next generation microprocessors, satellites, vehicles, medical treatment algorithms, etc. are just a few of countless examples. New discoveries that lead to a better understanding of how the “world works,” and make it work for us as well, often save lives, mitigates pain, increase justice and compassion, or perhaps simply fills us with a sense of awe. Scientific treatises and derived equations like e = mc2, or new perspectives from philosophical thought like the equality of humans and consequent eventual condemnation of slavery, rejection of subordination of women, improving “status” and rights of the LGBTQ community, and other injustices are instances of novel ideas that led to other improvements for the well-being of many.

These gains in knowledge or technological artifacts are often not complex systems, although they might be the product of complex systems working within yet other complex systems. At times, technologies like communication networks and city electrical infrastructures, can attain the level of complexity themselves. Still, even in the nascent stages where they might not yet have achieved the syntactical informational depth and dynamism needed for complexity, it is their instrumental value as with other artifacts and processes with novel semantic import to us and other agents that can make them either a good or a bad. Unfortunately, new discoveries like a new method of torture, how to make an atomic bomb, or another harmful way to extract resources from a rainforest are not new goods being justifiably inflicted on complexities, so we at least need to add that a novelty be “net positive” even if that added caveat can be challenging to make at times.

Combining Information Types

A more elevated good can also be achieved by combining that which has a high degree of complexity (syntactics), meaning or purpose (semantics), and rarity (novelty or “surprise”). Empiric evidence supports this proposition: If “John or Joan Doe” dies, it will likely be listed in the local newspaper’s obituary, and their circle of friends and relatives will attend the memorial services because their relationship to them had great meaning and a singular complexity has been lost. While John and Joan were truly unique in the strictest sense of the word, they might not have been especially unique so that the regional or national news mentions their death. If a head of state, a major religious community leader, famous movie actor, or a gifted athlete of a popular sport dies, however, the nation and even world will note their passing more widely in the news, perhaps pen their biography, and at times fly the national flag at half-staff while many gather to mourn their loss. It seems that these people are accorded additional social and moral value when they had significant meaning to a greater number of people and their level of talent, position, circumstance, or other quality made them “more novel.” Figure 5 is an abstract graphical representation of this proposition. Of course, the oft stated ideal is that everyone is of similar value, including and especially of similar ethical value, even if the empirical world seems to shout otherwise.

Figure 5. A Good can be “elevated” by the summation of its syntactical content (complexity), semantical importance (graphics within the parentheses that includes a brain with a musical note), and its novelty (graphics within the parentheses that includes the brain with an “!” mark).

Complex-Information Theory Summary

Critics might state that C-I theory has simply rephrased old ethical tenets in the lexicons of thermodynamics, information theory, and complexity science. Is C-I theory little more than utilitarianism dressed up in other terms, with perhaps the addition of other complex systems besides humans? There is some merit to this assertion, but the analysis and verbiage is necessary to determine, not just the universal qualities of some aspects of ethics, but if, when and how ethics might fit in the natural world. In summary, C- I theory concurs with V&D that the preservation and promotion of complexities approaches, even if there are caveats, a universal good. Artifacts and processes that are not complex but important semantically can also be worth preserving and promoting, but this assertion is due to their instrumental value to other complexities like humans, societies, and ecosystems, rather than their intrinsic value – whose intrinsic nature is based on it being a prerequisite for ethics to even be present.

Although the basic premises of C-I theory are relatively simply stated, its analysis and application can quickly become complicated. An analysis must not only consider the different kinds and degrees of information that might be relevant, but often must consider the weighing of one or more complexity, the future fate of those complexities, and the syntactical “depth” of them as well. Also, for a complexity like a human being that is dependent on various other complexities such as society, technological infrastructures, the environment, etc., attaining a state of overall well-being is even more difficult. Figure 6 abstractly depicts 4 overlapping circles of complexity relational spaces that, non-comprehensively, are necessary for a person to be in a general state of well-being. If a person exists at the intersection of all these circles of relational well-being, they are fortunate to be experiencing at least four of many of the important ingredients needed to be living “the good life.”

Figure 6. Each circle represents a range of relata or syntactical information, where a complexity is functioning well. A fully realized human well-being is dependent on multiple complexities existing in a state of well-being, only a few of which are represented here.

The preview of information, entropy, and complexity was necessary to set the groundwork for making and defending the proposal that the foundation of ethics can be understood to be dependent and even originate in the deeper machinations of the physical universe. It need not just be contingent on the interests of humans. In the end, the many complexities of the milieu in which we exist can explain why there are so many different ethical theories, why metaethics has multiple controversies, the causal underpinnings of ethical relativism, subjectivism, and much more.

The fact that we have complex minds in the midst of complex societies that are in turn exist in a complex world also bodes ill for any simple stated normative ethic or ethical theory. Scott Page, a complexity science authority from the University of Michigan has an apt metaphor for a key characterization of a complex world: it consists of “dancing” (ever-changing) landscapes,” as opposed to a “simple” unchanging “Mount Fuji,” or even a rugged (but still static) mountain range (Page S, (2009), “Understanding Complexity,” Lecture 2, Chantilly, PA, The Great Courses). The landscape metaphor is meant to demonstrate that in a complex world the optimum solution to a problem (represented by peaks) is dynamically changing over time due to both the many variables present, as well as the often indeterministic interactions of the agents that compose a complex system(s). Hence, while ethics might propose a few ever-present tall peaks, like “you ought to help someone in dire need if you are readily able’” and a few deep ever-present valleys like “do not torture or rape others,” most ethical “ought peaks” and “ought-not valleys” shift as world views, societies, and even the physical world itself changes. Sacrificing someone so that the rains will fall to nourish crops is one blatant example of ethical relativism. Human sacrifice seemed defensible ethically when a world-view included an angry rain god that had to be appeased so that food crops would not fail and lead to mass starvation. It was a simple utilitarian calculus – sacrifice the one to save the many! However, once it became accepted that sacrificing someone would not enhance the chance of crop-saving rains, the “peak” of sacrificing to a rain god, quickly morphed to become a “valley” of needless murder. Adaptation it seems is necessary for ethical practice, as well as the preservation of species or other complex systems. But then “adaptation” is a term comfortable in complexity science, whereas “relativism” might have been used traditional in ethics.